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Language Theory 
Deconstructing a Grammar: 
Locality, Minimality, and the Subjunctive 
0.0 A Sophism 
I want to begin by acknowledging the sophistical argument this essay makes from 
the start. Through the mouth of Socrates Plato has let us know what little regard he had 
for the sophisms of the Sophists. It is clear that what he despised most in the Sophists 
was their disregard for Dialectic, the human faculty composed of the logical operations or 
Collection and Division. Together, these two operations composed the method of 
Dialectic, or dialectical reasoning. I am afraid I'll be remiss with respect to dialectic in 
this essay since my collections will not coalesce into a synthetic unity nor will my 
divi sions descend from one. Indeed, I am forced to wonder if, when all is said and done, 
my essay will be guided by anything hardly rational. 
In thi s essay I wish to establish a theoretical and empirical ligature between 
generative grammar and deconstruction. How and why these two branches of knowledge 
should have such liaisons are of course question of tremendous historical scope. My aim 
is not so much to present new data but bring a certain perspective to already existing data 
c1 ncl theory in the fields of syntax and semantics. The perspective I want to bring aligns 
Chomsky ' s Principle of Full Interpretation with Derridean differ_nce. I take Chomsky 's 
Principle of Full Interpretation to be a version of the principle of identity and its twin, 
noncontradiction. In fact, the Principle of Full Interpretation might be one of the 
strongest instantiations of identity and noncontradiction in the intellectual market place 
today. A derivation, or a nati ve speaker's computation of grammaticality for some 
c1rbitrary string of syntactic phrases, converges because each lexical item satisfies the 
head, specifier, or complement features of some other lexical item. Everything is in its 
place on both the phonetic and semantic sides of the linguistic sign. As I will argue, 
Derridean differ_nce disturbs the Principle of Full Interpretation not by threatening 
identity as if from the 'outside' but on the contrary, but by posing from the 'inside ' the 
possibil ity that Full Interpretation and Derridean differ_nce might actually be the same 
thing. This reduction to and by differ_nce would make of the former a kind of null 
hypothesis. In my exposition, I first give empirical characterization of both local ity and 
minimali ty in order to show how these phenomena began to disintegrate in front of the 
grammatical category and function language theory and practi ce calls the subjunctive 
mood. As I said, my conclusion will be hardly rational, if even pronounceable. 
1.1 Some Data for Locality: Argument Structure 
The history of generative grammar has been a movement towards the theoretical 
concepts of locality and minimality. Working in tandem, locality and minimality keep 
grammatical theori zation close to the data. Locality requires that the principles of 
grammar first and foremost take account of adjacent or nearly adjacent categories, 
positions, or relations. For instance, in the expression of argument structu re, that is, the 
relationship of a verb to its stri ctly selected complements, the locality condition requires a 
statement that such strictly selected complements are always realized in the vicinity of 
the selecting verb. Minimality exploits this observation by stipulating that no rule of 
grammar interrelate two grammatical elements if some third element intervenes. The 
locality observation is by no means trivial and it is the subject of major theory 
construction in generati ve grammar, as in the work of Manzini (l 992). In the current 
Minimali st framework, locality is pervasive throughout the principles and parameters of 
grammar in and through the work of the Minimal Link Condition (Chomsky 1995 3 11 ). 
In all cases, locali ty quickly captures the direction of the assignment of thematic roles to 
nouns by a verb, as in the contrast between/ ear and /righten: 
( I) a. The boy scouts fear the thunder 
b. The thunder frightens the boy scouts. 
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In more subtle cases, locality acquires a high degree of descriptive adequacy. In the 
following data, locality effectively differentiates between 2-place predicates and 3-place 
predicates when the feature [±TENSEl is manipulated. 
(2 a. I promised Mary TO buy her chocolate. 
b. I promised Mary THAT I WOULD buy her chocolate. 
(3) a. I persuaded Mary TO buy Harry chocolate. 
b. I persuaded Mary THAT she SHOULD buy Harry chocolate. 
(4) a. I expected Mary TO buy Harry chocolate. 
b. I expected THAT Mary WOULD buy Harry chocolate. 
(5) a. Thelma believes Louise TO have abandoned her husband. 
b. Thelma believes THAT Louise HAS abaridoned her husband. 
The verbs promise and persuade are both 3-place predicates as each se lects three 
arguments to express their propositional content. Promise, for instance:(i) the Agent 
thematic role in the subject position, (ii) the Beneficiary thematic role in indirect object 
position, and (iii ) the Theme role, i.e., the content of what is promised or the constituent 
in a direct object position. The manipulation of the feature [±TENSE[ establi shes an 
underly ing contrasts between promise and persuade on the one hand and expect and 
believe on the other. The f-TENSEl versions make it difficult to know whether the Noun 
Phrase Mary is closer to the embedded clause or the matrix verb. Only when one 
111anipulates the feature [TENSEJ in the embedded sentences do we see that promise and 
persuade require the NP to stay outside the domain of the tensed clause. Expect and 
believe are both 2-place predicate verbs. Expect selects two roles, the Agent-as-
E.rperiencer and the state of affairs the verb projects, a pat of the conceptual-intentional 
interface I eve. These two thematic roles divide into a syntactic subject and a syntactic 
object. This description further implies that promise and persuade involve a relation of 
control between a Noun Phrase in the matrix and the subject of the infinitive. Promise 
and persuade, for instance, have contrastive control relations. The subject of promise 
controls the reference of the subject of the infinitive, while it is the object of persuade 
that performs the control. More fully spelled out , (2a) and (3a) demonstrate these 
relations of control with indices and the nonphonentic pronominal PRO: 
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(.6) a. I ; promised Mary lPRO; TO buy her chocolateJ 
(7) a. I persuaded Mary; f PRO; TO buy me chocolate·! 
Thus, the verbs prom.ise and persuade contrast in their selectional properties with those of 
e.1pect and believe and locality attains descriptive adequacy by sketching the relative 
difference the Noun Phrase Mary plays in the verbs promise and persuade as against 
expect ancl believe. The distinct grouping of arguments in a promise or persuade 
projection versus a persuade and believe projection is a sign that locality is at work 
inasmuch as the claim of the distinct groupings is that both promise and persuade are 
thematically marked in the matrix clause rather than in the embedded clause, despite 
surface similarities to the infinitive counterparts. Locality will also 111ark the lower clause. 
as a site with its own internally motivated thematic structure. Shifting the value from a 
minus to a plus also shows that expect is a 2-place predicate, a fact that also holds for 
believe. Schematically, locality gives us the following description: 
(A). NP+ {promise, persuade}+ NP+ {CLAUSE} 
X ....................... .. ..... ... Y ...... ...... Z 
The descriptive formula in (A) is meant to accord with Manzini 's definition of locality, 
phrased in terms of the axiomatic notion of dependency: "If a is a dependent element, 
there is antecedent~ for a, and a sequence(~, .... , a) that satisfies government." (142) 
To satisfy government means exactl y to be in a local relation either by way of indexing or 
by adjacency. On the one hand co-indexation establishes a link via coreference and on 
the other adjacency makes a head out of one of two dependent elements. Though 
government is a notion and syntactic configuration the Minimalist Program would like to 
dispense with, it tends to survi ve in the theory (at least) as thematic marking by head on a 
complement. It seems that a basic intent of the Minimalist Program is to make thematic 
marking a phenomenon that happens only once-need happen onl y once- and thus an 
aue,np l to keep all deri vations to a single step. The verbs promise and persuade govern 
X , Y, and Z, but none of the contents (inside) of argument Z. If an element inside the Z-
argument is moved out of its clausal domain and intervenes between the verb, and, say Y 
and Z, the locality constraint would predict an ungrammatical structure. 
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(8) a. *Ii promised Mary chocolate PROi TO buy her _; 
b. *l promised Mary chocolate; THAT I WOULD buy her _; 
c. *I persuaded Mary chocolate; PROi TO buy her_; 
cl . * I persuaded Maryi chocolate; THAT shei SHOULD buy Harry_; 
All the structures in (8) show that an errant argument has dissatisfied locality, but how? 
Fi rst of all. the direct object argument of buy cannot be made part of the valency of either 
prornise or persuade. The errant argument chocolate has di sturbed a local relation 
between the selecting verb the selected clausal argument. It is at thi s juncture that 
minimality comes to supplement locality by barring any kind of grammatical element 
from disrupting any link between two grammatical elements that satisfies locality, in 
whatever version In the classification of declarative interrogative mood clauses locality 
also plays a crucial role. 
1.2 Declaratives, interrogatives, and locality 
(9) (a). I hope THAT Thelma WILL dance after lunch 
(b). I hope FOR Thelma TO dance after lunch 
(c) . I wonder WHETHER Thelma WILL dance after lunch. 
(cl) . I wonder WHETHER TO dance after lunch. 
(e). I wonder IF Thelma WILL dance after lunch. 
These data exemplify the local dependencies the main verb of each clause enters into 
with the COMPLEMENTIZER (the subordinating conjunction), ancl the 
COMPLEMENIZER with the grammatical feature [±FINITE] of the embedded clauses. 
These local dependencies then come to furnish the empirical criteria for classifying 
clauses in terms of declarative and interrogative moods. The verb hope always selects an 
indicative clause, the selection expressed through the COMPLEMENTIZERS THATan cl 
FOR. T he former depends locally on the feature l+FINITE TENSE I and the latter 
depends on the feature I-FINITE TENSE]. The verb wonder interacts with the 
COMPLEMENTIZER WHETHER, and WHETHER interacts with the plus or minus 
va lues of the feature I FINITE I. Notice that IF groups with WHETHER to signify 
interrogative mood, but groups with THAT in relation to the feature I +FINITEI, that is, 
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there is no untensed version of IF. More loosely, the main verb depends on the 
subordinating conjunction and the subordinating conjunction depends on the type of 
inflection in the embedded verb. The following set of formulas serves to describe these 
local dependencies: 
(B) (i). Yl±WH ll ±TENSE II 
(B) (ii ). l+WH I = {WHETHER, IF} 
(B). (iii ). 1- WHI = {THAT, FOR} 
These fo rmulas are descripti vely adequate for the classification of clauses in to either 
indicative or interrogative moods. Simply to repeat, hope is the kind of verb that selects 
only THAT and FOR and hence it is able to determine only declarative grammatical 
mood. Wonder selects a l+WHI for its COMPLEMENTIZER and thus it is a verb that 
selects interrogative clausal complements. 
It is not a far step to take to see locality and minimality in thi s simple two-way 
structural taxonomy. Expressed over the nodes and branches of an X-bar syntacti c tree, 
locali ty requires that relations between grammatical formatives be as close as possible. 
Mi nimali ty is used to define just how close two grammatical elements may be, doing so 
with the negative condition that no grammatical element may intervene or di srupt the 
locc1I or potentially local relation between two other elements. 
l.3 Minimality: Its Global Impact 
Minimality is the inheritor of a structural formula that in the hi story of generative 
gra mmar was meant to account for certain grammaticality effects thar the feature 
I+ TENSEI has in embedded clauses. These effects were referred to as the Tensed 
Sentence Condition (TSC) and the Specified Subject Condition (SSC). The formula took 
thi s shape: 
(C). .. . X . .. 1 ..... Y ... I, where a contains TENSE or a Specified Subjec t Z. 
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T he precise effects that th is formula was to account for deserve an elaboration that I wi ll 
defer for the present. For now I wi ll simply say that it was the desire to eli minate the 
di sj unctive nature of the formula that led to the more unified account called minimality. 
Th is desire led to the formulation of the minimality condition such that not just the 
effects of the TSC and SSC could be accounted for but a global array of grammatical 
data. Mi nimality is defined over the following syntactic configuration: 
( I)). lxr, lx·X YPl x· Iv· Y ZPI ,,.1 xr 
Luigi Rizzi ( l 990) defines minimality in terms of the structural relation of constituent 
command, an axiom developed to treat syntax in hierarchical terms and not just linear 
terms. The axiom of constituent command uses the node and branches of an X-bar tree to 
defi ne explicitly how constituents come into contact with other constituents. In the 
strongest definition, a node X constituent commands a node Y !FF the fi rst branching 
node dominating X dominates Y. This version not only keeps a phrasal domain local bu t 
small as wel l, making fo r a phrase that is quite ' flat' . This is in effect !he government 
relation by a lexical head on a complement as the one puts its thematic mark on the 
second. Building on the work of Chomsky (1 986), Rizzi form ulates minimality with the 
intention of covering the effects of the Empty Category Principle, which states that all 
traces must be properly governed. The Empty Category Principle is perhaps the most 
under-determined piece of linguistic theory but it seems to find its va lidity not so much in 
requiri ng that a trace be properly governed but in requiring it to have a proper identity in 
language. That is, before the technical definition of proper government comes into play, 
ECP already seems to imply that if a trace exists, its existence shoul d stem from some 
category of language. The product of movement, traces reproduce copies of themselves 
as sil ent constituents left behind when a category vacates one slot to fill another. These 
must be properly governed in the double sense of thematic marking or co-indexation. 
Proper government thus crucially involves the definition of minimali ty. In a relation of 
proper government, states Ri zzi, X governs Y, " .. . only if there is no Z such that (i) Z is a 
typical a -governor for Y, (ii) Z c-commands Y and does not c-command X" ( 1990 7). 
The term 'a-governor' stands for the double senses of government. The employment of 
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min imality in the defi ni tion of proper government makes it impossible for the variables X 
and Y ever to establi sh any kind of local link so long as Z intervenes, that is, so long as Z 
and Y are already in a local relation such as government by a head. Given syntactic 
confi guration (D), the typical governor of ZP is Y and that of YP is X. The fi rst 
branching node that dominates Y dominates ZP and forms a local domain, as in the case 
of lex ical government. So long as this process is respected , no closer governor can exist 
fo r Z P other than Y and any attempt on the part of X to govern ZP w i 11 be interpreted as a 
viola tion of locality and minimality. Therefore no link can be establi shed between X ancl 
Z P because Y c-commands ZP, i.e., as the closer potential governor, it automatically 
excludes the potential government of X. 
For generative grammar, the structural configuration (D) is a uni versal as much as 
locality and mini mal ity. No matter what type of grammatical dependency is being dealt 
with, thi s configuration will di sallow the establi shment of any of link between X and ZP 
so long as Y is in the way. However, the elegance of the formula is owed not so much to 
Lhe tree geometry over which minimality and locality are defined as much as to the 
ta utology inscri bed in the clause that stipulates a typical governor. Minimality is a 
tautology vis-a-vis locality insofar as it requires the head-complement relation to be a 
case of local government but defines local government in terms of a negati ve condition 
prohi biting the disturbance of local relations in the first place. Because the clause 
rnncerning the typical governor is a form of di stributional regularity, the definition 
immediately guarantees the local relation between a constituent-commanding governor 
and its complement(s). The constituent command relation codifies what is already a local 
relation, or in other words, expresses a redundancy that is much more a part of the theory 
of grammar than the data. Thus, thi s redundancy is not so much essential as theory-
internal. Locality and minimality run up against this tautology because the distinction 
between them can be neutralized , if the negative condi tion attaching to the definition of 
mi nimality is subtracted. 
1.4 Locality and Minimality: The Reduction to Differ_nce 
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T he neutrali zation of locality and minimality implies they are inte r-substitutable 
in the sense that to deal wi th locality is to deal with minimality and vice versa. We can 
get a glimpse of this inter-substitutability in the data posed by the declarative and 
interrogative moods. In declaratives, WH-movement appears unbounded, that is, a WH-
phrase can move past an indefi nite number of complementizer positi ons so long as the 
grammatical element THAT or I -WHI is the head of CP, leaving the ISPEC, CPJ 
position as a possible landing site for the WH-phrase in transit. The WH phrase lands in 
every ava ilable I SPEC, CPI position just to satisfy locality and in sum makes the entire 
clomain of the clause a kind of local space. Whether performed step-wise, one local link 
at a time, or in one fell swoop from its extraction site to the question mark position, 
IS PEC, CPI, the movement of the WH phrase produces grammatical results as in ( I 0). 
The unbounded movement of WH elements within the domain of declaratives is so 
smooth that one begins to wonder if minimality ever existed. 
( I 0) (b ). John said THAT Mary thought THAT Harry would buy ti ckets to the rodeo 
fo r all of us. 
(b'). What; did John say THAT Mary thought THAT Harry would buy -r; to the 
rodeo for al l of us? 
(b"). For whom; did John say THAT Mary thought THAT Harry would buy 
ti ckets to the rodeo -r;? 
Movement of a WH-phrase across CP nodes fi lled with other WH elements is more 
problematic and their manipulation brings ungrammaticality to the surface: 
( I I) (a). John said THAT Mary wondered WHETHER Harry would buy ti ckets to the 
rodeo fo r al I of us. 
(a'). ?*What; did John say THAT Mary wondered WHETH ER Harry would buy T , 
for all us? 
(a ").?*For whom; did John say THAT Mary wondered WHETHER Harry would 
buy tickets to the rodeo -r;? 
The contrastive sets ( I 0) and ( I I) show the interrogative sentences (a' ) and (a") to be at 
the borderline of grammaticality. The tokens (a') and (a") are ungrammatical because the 
moved WH element does not and cannot land in the I SPEC, CPl of the lowest clause, 
which is already fi ll ed with a pre-established WH element. In these cases, the WH 
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element fai ls to transit in the way required by locality, step-wise, one hop at a time, from 
its base position to the first available !SPEC, CP] and every other one thereafter. Since 
the moved element does not land there, a violation of locality ensues. When the moved 
WH element arrives at its final !SPEC, CP] it will already have traversed the node that 
insures its impending ungrammatical status. It may be impossible to delineate locali ty 
and minimality as self-standing conditions of grammar because, operating over exactly 
the same structural domain, minimality can make sense only in relation to locality and 
'" l I c·1.1u . Doc::, the locality co11ditio11 identify a local syntactic spa--:c because no 
grnmmatica l element clefts it, or does minimality cleft a local syntact ic space precisely so 
as to identify what sort of geometri cal space can count as local on an X-bar tree? Here no 
doubt a weak disjunction 'or' begs the question. In (E), if Z is a trace-anaphor and X a 
WH-antecedent, then Y intersects the link between X and Z by virtue of constituent 
commanding Z but not X. The link between a moved WH and its extraction site, the 
position where it is assigned a thematic role, is rendered illicit by the fact that the WH 
element does not deposit a trace in the CP of the lower clause. In a sense, it is just this 
violation that allows the grammatical notion of locality to emerge in a non-trivial sense. 
That is, presumably it would be a problem at the Articulatory-Perceptual and Conceptual-
1 ntentional levels to receive inputs from grammatical competence deali ng only with 
declaratives structures, even if they are considered unmarked. Given minimal ity, the 
grammarian knows straightaway what can count as a local geometri ca l space and what 
, .. 11i1u1. J'h u:-,, J'urrnula (E) expresses thi s grammatical knowledge, 1, r equal ly as well, thi :-; 
knowledge of ungrammaticality. 
(E). *IWH; . .. !WHETHER ... IV -c; LIi 
x .............. Y ... .............. z 
But knowledge of ungrammaticality also unsettles any neat division between 
locality and minimality. That is, I interpret the borderline of grammaticali ty of (a') and ( 
a") as a reassertion of locality to gain the lost space back. As the fo rce of the variable Y 
weakens, it erases its intervention on the local space created in the link between WH and 
a trace, as (E) expresses. The erasure of the intervening node could account for the 
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borderline grammatical status of these two tokens. Or, perhaps its better to say that the 
difference that both binds and repel the local ity and minimality is cleconstructable one. 
The claim to deconstructabil ity would fo llow immediately by subtracting the negation 
necessary for the definition the of minimality. The substraction is as arbitrary as the 
borderline grammaticali ty of tokens (a') and ( a") is real. Some of th is arbitrariness is 
assuaged by the data. Recall that WH movement is unbounded in declarati ve domains 
because every CP has a specifier position for WH element to land in. CPs with a l+WH j 
do not avail this position, except when l+WHJ = IF, a problematic situation fo r locality 
c1 nd minimality. 
Here it would be necessary to stipulate that IF projects a CP with a l+WHI head 
and thus has the form of an interrogative. The property of projecting as a head of CP 
groups IF with declarative THAT. Like the element THAT, IF depends on the featu re 
I+ TENSE! of the embedded clause as per the formulas of (B). Like THAT, IF also 
leaves the !SPEC, CPI position open for a WH-phrase to land. Unfortunately, thi s is not 
a desi red result. By leaving open !SPEC, CPJ as a landing site, a derivation with IF 
should not yield the even borderline grammaticality of the following token: 
( 12) (a). ?*John asked for whom; Mary wondered IF Jerry would buy ti ckets for the 
rodeo 't; 
lnstec1d , it should yield a fully grammatical token as (13b) precisely because both tokens 
obey the locali ty constraint: 
( 13) (b). For whom; did John say THAT Mary thought THAT Jerry would buy tickets 
fo r the rodeo 't; 
To get beyond this di screpancy, the grammar needs the additional stipulation that every 
projection of IF projects a f+WHI element that occupies the !SPEC CP I position, sealing 
it off as an avai lable landing site. The stipulation thereafter makes the movement of the 
WH-phrase a violation of minimality in order to get an explanation fo r the borderline 
grammatical status of ( 12a). Regardless, whether a [SPEC, CPI position is available or 
not in a CP headed by IF, ( 12a) will retain its borderline status. 
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The fact that WH movement in this case is indifferent to the availability of a 
position it should not otherwise ignore speaks to the neutralization that can take place 
between the locality and minimality conditions. IF acts as a hinge between the 
declarative and interrogative moods, and just as critically, between minimality and 
locality. Why should IF have such a place in the taxonomy between declaratives and 
interrogatives? The unbounded movement of WH elements in declarative domains is 
primafacie evidence for the unmarked status of declaratives. It would not be surprising 
then for a feature of the grammar to tend towards the unmarked encl of a certain kind of 
gra mmatical link , relation, or function. But interrogative IF al so shows a close proximity 
to the subjunctive, and not just in semantic form or illocutionary force. As with IF, the 
subjuncti ve is evidence of the work of minimality in the grammar precisely because it 
violates locality. 
2.1 Percolation as Data: The Subjunctive 
The neutralization that differentiates and binds locality and minimality together is 
evident in the difficult time they have accounting for the subjunctive mood. As with the 
case of interrogatives and declaratives, the selection of the subjunctive mood in an 
embedded clause is in a complex dependent relation with the matrix verb. The difference 
is that formulas of the (B) type do not di splay the dependence obtaining between matrix 
and embedded verbs. 
( 13). (a) . Je veux QUE tu y ailles/*vas 
(b). (Yo) quiero QUE tu vayas allf/*vas allf 
(c). I demand THAT he go there/%goes there. 
Minimality intervenes in the local space occupied by the link the matrix and embedded 
verbs create when the subjunctive is a possibility. The matrix verb and QUE/THAT are 
i11 a legitimate dependence relation as are QUE/THAT and the embedded verb inflecting 
fo r the subjunctive. The subjunctive relation of the embedded verb and the matrix 
however is left illegitimate or unexpressed, in full violation of Chomsky 's Principle of 
Full Interpretation. This principle of grammar of course has its counterpart in philosophy 
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as the principles of identity, noncontradiction, and the excluded miclclle. Full 
Interpretation is a strong version of these, requiring every element in a derivation to be 
strictl y li censed by the data. Chomsky puts it rather more technicall y: "We now say that 
the representation A satisfies Fl at LF if it consists entirely of legitimate objects; a 
derivation forming A converges at LF if A satisfies FI , and otherwise crashes" (MP, 194. 
It is th us imperati ve that a legitimate relation like the one expressed in the subjunctive be 
expressed in the grammar in a descriptive notation adequate to the task. To do this the 
grammar will also have to mark in some way that QUE has two interpretations, 
declarative and subjuncti ve readings. There is thus a lack of resolution in form ula (B. iii) 
in which 1-WH I = QUE or FOR. This formula implictly grants the declarative unmarked 
status. QUE here contains radically different semantic roots; QUE is ambiguous, at times 
a declarative T HAT and at other times a subjunctive THAT. 
To deal with thi s ambiguity, the grammar neutrali zes the locality/minimality 
distinction agai n, this time through the use of the concept of percolation. Percolation is a 
way to all ow the relation between matri x and embedded verbs to remai n local despite the 
minimality violation. Percolation allows the subjunctivity of the embedded verb to attain 
a position adjacent to QUE, thus associating it with the subjunctive and legitimizing an 
interpretation that diverges from cleclarativity. Percolation has not survived the 
theoretical razors of the Minimal ist Program but I mention it here to emphasize how such 
a device as simple percolation can turn the illegitimate into the legitimate, minimality 
into locality. Percolation is thus one more sign in the grammar that locali ty and 
minimality fold into the same geometrical space. The negative condition that 
differentiates minimal ity from locality is just that fold. A simple fo ld in a page turns a 
violation of minimality into locality. Whi le a tighter theoretical bond between these two 
principles of grammar is hard to find , notice that it is also arbitrary. What counts as a 
legitimate local geometrical space is always already conditioned by the negative in the 
same way that identity, non-contradiction, and the excluded middle condition each other . 
.Just as identity cannot arise without negation, so minimali ty makes sense of local ity. The 
nature of the difference between minimality and locality is therefore not at all a bipolar 
oi1e, in the sense that one carries a plus value and the other a minus, even if minimality 
carries the negation. Rather the difference is of the type in which the negation is a 
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condition fo r both principles of grammar. In this type of difference both locality and 
rn inimality share the negative value that neither is comprehensible without the other. 
Therefore, whatever constitutes their difference cannot be neutralized in toto, but must be 
conserved in the neutralization. Deconstruction does not have a right to call thi s a 
sublation or synthesis, though it does reserve a certain spelling for that difference. This 
type of difference in a sense brings things to a standstill because of the necessity to 
express both difference and its neutralization. 
It is this type of difference that also aligns with the Principle of Full 
I 11tcrprctation. Chomsky is quite clear about the import of thi s principle and it is not in 
the f irst instance to hand a native speaker a faculty for intelligibility or mutual 
comprehension between speaking subjects in complex ritual interact ion: "A convergent 
de ri vation may produce utter gibberish, exactly as at P[honeti c I F[ orrn [. Ling uistic 
expression may be 'deviant' along all sorts of incommensurable dimensions, and we have 
110 notion of ' well-formed sentence'. Expressions have the interpretati on assigned to 
them by the performance systems in which the language is embedded: period" (MP, 194). 
It fo llows Full Interpretation represents a cap on legitimate objects in syntax, a kind of 
lower and upper limit in the grammar. These empirical boundary conditions are not 
limits on linguistic expression, since a derivation can be 'gibberi sh' and still not crash. 
Instead, Full Interpretation, as the convergence of derivations, is there to insure that all 
deri vations respect all principles of grammar. When universal grammar is respected thus. 
the perfo rmance systems have nothing to worry about. All of (or most of al l) the 
grarnrnatica l digits have been computed a priori and unconsciously. 111 a sense, when 
Full Interpretation takes place, everything in the native speaker's mi nd is at a standstill 
with respect to questions of grammaticality. There is nothing to do bul talk, concern 
ourselves with the performance. On this interpretation,, the more support generative 
grammar fi nds support for Full Interpretation, the more the variations of parti cular 
languages will be neutralized higher, more abstract, and ultimately invari ant principles of 
universal grammar. The more generative grammar discovers the invari ant principles of 
uni versal grammar- the ' free' knowledge we have by virtue of inherit ing a human 
cul ture - the less the variations of parti cular languages will be significant, except as 
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variations on a theme. One can count the ergative-absolutive and nominative-accusative 
di stinction as part of this trend. 
It is curious that universal grammar attains explanatory adequacy by neutralizing 
particular language difference into formal and highly abstract principles. If language is 
part of nature and nothing more, a unique faculty of human beings adequate to the 
interpretations of the pe1formance systems, then it is in the ' nature' of uni versa! 
grammar to reduce linguistic data to an invariable calculus. It shares this' nature' with 
deconstruction inasmuch as the latter relies on the special sense of difference in which 
neutralizations conserve the neutralized differences. Both attain to thei r own kind of 
ex planatory adequacy on the back of this curious kind of difference. For generative 
grammar this implies a constant tension between theory and data, something akin to 
making sure that there are no counter-examples. For deconstruction, explanatory 
adequacy implies that the deconstructor successfully subtracts the metaphysics of 
presence inhabiting language at all levels. In their ideal states, the projects of both 
generative grammar and deconstruction will leave nothing to be explained. If the 
Minimalist Program can be instantiated, the principles of grammatical computations will 
be shown to be transparent, the self-evident principles constituting the essence of 
language; and the Principle of Full will receive full support. Similarly, if deconstruction 
were to be exhaustively instantiated, Full Interpretations would be defeasable and the 
special sense of difference would be responsible. This difference would reduce universal 
grammar along with itself to a null hypothesis. Fortunately, no one is claiming that there 
is nothing to explain as there is plenty to explain. 
2.2 BeJond the Null Hypothesis: Universal Grammar= Differ_nce 
The hypothesis that both universal grammar and deconstruction strive after the 
null hypothesis, as the empirical completion of their respective projects implies, is at the 
same time a hypothesis about the subjunctive. The subjunctive hypothesis tries to make 
sense of why the interrogative mood, declarative-like IF, and subjunctive inflection affect 
locality so much. In its specificity, it goes against the grain of the unmarked status 
normally granted to the declarative. It reverses the relation of markedness among clause 
1 5 
rypes. The hypothesis treats the subjunctive as more than a chain of geometrical values 
in a syntactic configuration. In its specificity, the hypothesis turns to the feature 
11 RREALIS I in order to reverse clause markedness relations and endow X-bar 
configurations with this added value. 
F. R. Pa lmer gives a thorough empirical description of the range of functions the 
subjunctive can take and I turn to it to give cross-linguistic balance to the hypothesis that 
rhe subjuncti ve. In particular, I wish to take from his cross-linguisti c description of the 
subjunctive in the world 's languages the language specific category or grammatical 
marker known as the irrealis. The irrealis is mood marked in languages li ke Jacaltec and 
Ngiyambaa, the one a language of Mexico and the other of N.S. Wales, Australi a. In 
these languages the featu re irrealis grammatically marks a relation between an event and 
it s relative lack of grounding, i.e., whether or not the reported event has taken place. For 
instance, in Jacaltec the irreali s inflection marks both of these events: 
( 14) (a). chur-oj ab scul nama tu 
get angry-IRR EXH stomach people that 
' let them get angry!' 
(b) . x' -'oc heb ix say-a hun-uj munlabal 
ASP-start PL woman look for FUT IRR pot 
' the women wi ll/may look for a pot' 
The ( 14a) example is an exhortation in which the reported event, or better yet, the 
declaration of the wish that the event be grounded to some degree, projects the 
presupposition: they may already be angry. Secondly, the event is expressed with an 
ironic function, an indirect illocutionary force. The (14b) example shows that the 
in flection on the verb is for both future tense and the mood marker I RREALIS. In this 
case, the prediction is that the ungrounded event will take place. As a feature 
IIRREALISI encodes a degree of commitment on the part of the speaker to the 
groundeclness of the event. The speaker assumes a position relative to the degree of 
grouncledness in the event, a value in the feature [b-IRREALIS 1- X-bar phrase structure 
encodes the projection I 6-IRREALIS I from the morphosyntax of a language whether or 
11 o t thar language has explicit morpheme for this relation between speaker and reported 
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event , that is, it projects universally and cross-linguistically. If this is so, the feature 16-
1 RREALIS I is part of linguisti c competence, knowledge of the imaginary status of the 
reported event. Performance systems interpret the imaginary status of an event, which is 
as much inside the syntax as outside of it. While X-bar phrase structure is ill -equipped to 
encode thi s part of linguistic knowledge, Full Interpretation demands that no principle of 
grammar sli ght any aspect of lingui stic competence. In that spirit, I reduce al l the (B) 
formulas to (B '), a weak approximation to the Full Interpretation requirement. 
(B'). V 1811, where 8 = a phrasal domain affected by 16-IRREALI SI 
This formula retreats into the collapsibi lity of minimality and locality. When a speaker 
utters a subjuncti ve, the syntax expresses a minimal link between an imaginary event and 
its 16-IRREALIS I whose potential value is computed by linguistic competence. The gap 
grammaticizes the subjuncti ve, demands it, so to speak. 
Formula (B') presupposes that any and all domains in which an event is reported 
wi ll be affected by some degree of IRREALIS, even those that are strongly declarative. 
The current usage with ' like' in the function of COMPLEMENTIZER may be an 
expression of this sort of projection. What the subjunctive data suggest is the possibi lity 
that the subjunctive mood may be more basic than the declarative mood. ln certain sense. 
thi s would be like claiming that knowledge of an event's groundedness is more basic than 
know ledge of deep structure. On that intepretation, the subjunctive would be the 
unmarked mood. I leave the question of the imperative mood suspended. 
(F). TH E SUBJUNCTIVE HYPOTHESIS: Subjunctive(~ Declarative~ Interrogative) 
In the unmarked position, the subjunctive mood has in effect 'percolated' past the CP 
where its amal gamation with QUE should have kept it put. Now notice what happens 
when ' percolation' is interpreted in sati sfaction of Full Interpretation. 
Suppose that the verb to Leave has absolutely no post-verbal thematic role to 
assign. T his thought experment neutrali zes the semantic differences between and among 
the various thematic markings represented in the following descripti ve paradigm. 
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( 15). (a) . Mary left 
(b). Mary left {early, late, at noon ... } 
(c). Mary left {home, the park ... } 
(cl). Mary left home in a hurry 
(e). Mary left a book 
(f). Mary left a book behind 
(g). Mary left a book on the table 
(h). Mary left me a book 
(i). Mary left a book for me 
(j). Mary left Harry 
(k). Mary left Harry behind 
(I). Mary left Harry for another 
( 111 ). Mary left Harry in the park 
(n). Mary left Harry in a lurch (idiom chunk) 
(o). Mary left in a boat/car 
T hese thematic markings have to do with the semantic notions of PERSON , THING, 
PLACE, TIME, etc. Under such a condition of neutralization, the various thematic 
markings are subtracted from leave to yield something that goes beyond even the 
mi nimal member of the paradigm ( 15a), which seems to retain an implicit argument. 
Subtract that implicit argument and we end up with a structural representation like the 
following: 
( 16) (a'). ~L Mary left -0 
Let p be the moment of utterance. Whether ( 16a') converges or crashes depends on 
whether - 0 is a legitimate object, interpretable by Full Interpretation. If it crashes, a 
perfectly pronounceable and interpretable string is erased from the tables of 
grammaticality. If it converges, we have to find a reading for thi s 'gibberish '. At 
utterance time ~L, here and know, I interpret and pronounce (16a') as the specification of 
an event in which the subject Noun Phrase Mary disperses in every direction at once. To 
leave in thi s special sense is not to engage in an action or process but to participate in a 
state that moves from the integrity of the subject's body and mind to bloodless 
disintegration in the blink of an eye. Because this special sense of leave remains 
unattested, the verb refers event that has a high coefficient of 16-IRR EALIS 1. 
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What would happen to the grammar as a whole if the subjunctive is allowed to 
project as in formula (B') and the subjunctive hypothesis is respected? Taken as an 
un marked relative to the other clausal moods, the subjunctive would project 'wi ldly' as in 
the ( I 6a') hypothetical. The subject would go along with projection of the predicate, 
treating Full Interpretation as a performative contradiction. It is Fu ll Interpretation that 
allows ( I 6a') to converge. At the same time, grammar as the unique property of a single 
human being would cease to exist and become language or langue, the unique property of 
human beings embedded in social culture. No longer a linguistic competence that resides 
inside a single individual , grammar would in the unattested sense of leave leave the 
empirical boundaries of the body to reside in human society far from any beyond. There, 
what we are accustomed to calling grammar will always already have been subject to and 
subject of all kinds of selectional pressures, hi storical contingencies, economi c 
vicissitudes, and every relation of power imaginable. 
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